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Abstract 
We argue that it may be inappropriate to study whether high-tech firms 
are liquidity-constrained, without first modeling their antecedent decision 
to apply for credit. This sample selection issue is relevant when studying 
a borrower-lender relationship, as the same factors can influence both 
the demand and the supply side. E.g., we find firms engaged in R&D to 
be less likely to request extra funds. When they do we observe a higher 
probability of being denied credit. Thus, our findings lend support to the 
notion of credit constraints being severe for innovative firms, although 
we suggest that other measures of innovative activity, in addition to total 
R&D expenditures, should be used to understand the occurrence of 
credit constraints in the high-tech sector. 
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Credit rationing occurs when a firm demands but is refused 
credit, even if it is willing to pay a higher interest rate (Freixas and 
Rochet, 1997). Indeed, an interest rate increment has four effects 
on the lender’s return to debt. First, an obvious positive price 
effect. Second, an adverse selection effect because best firms drop 
out of the market. Third, a positive selection effect due to the fact 
that some low-return high-risk entrepreneurs leave the market. 
Fourth, an adverse selection effect as some high-return low-risk 
switch to the equity market (Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). When 
the adverse selection effects dominate the positive effects, the 
result is an inverse relationship between interest rate increments 
and return to the bank. The efficient allocation of resources is not 
reached, and the result is insufficient lending (De Meza and Webb, 
2000). Conversely de Meza and Webb (1990) present a model 
where the equilibrium outcome within an asymmetric information 
environment is overlending.  
However, for firms in High-Tech sectors, on which this paper 
focuses, the overlending outcome is unlikely to occur. Carpenter 
and Petersen (2002) present the reasons why underlending best 
describes the relationship between innovative firms and lenders 
(see also Hall, 2002). First, information is not perfect for the very 
nature of innovation processes. The R&D process is uncertain 
because of the difficulties, even for the best-informed agent, to 
forecast output given the inputs employed (Arrow, 1962). R&D 
returns are, therefore, more unpredictable and uncertain, giving 
rise to moral hazard and adverse selection problems on the 
borrower’s part. A second aspect is related to the strategic need for 
secrecy, which causes firms not to share information with the 
lenders (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Furthermore, because 
R&D processes involve accumulation of capital, which has 
typically an intangible nature, investment has a  low collateral value, 
thereby limiting the access to credit. Finally, marginal cost of 
financial distress is likely to rise rapidly with leverage. Firms facing 
 3 
severe financial restrictions may have to abandon critical 
innovative projects, which crucially determine a firm’s growth 
opportunities. Financial markets usually anticipate this behaviour 
lowering a firms’ market value (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
Therefore, internal financing is crucial for innovation. 
This paper pursues two main objectives. First, following 
Guiso (1998), an investigation of the factors affecting a firm’s 
probability of having its credit application turned down is carried 
out. We focus in particular on different measures of R&D 
expenditures. Indeed, it turns out that using measures of, 
respectively, Self-Financed R&D outlays and R&D expenditures in 
internal facilities yields results that are different from those 
obtained in a regression including total R&D expenditures. 
Second, we extend Guiso’s approach by using a sample selection 
methodology that enables the distinction between the 
determinants of extra credit demand and those influencing the 
success of a credit application. This is an important difference 
because only the sub-sample of firms needing extra credit should 
be considered in the analysis of whether a firm’s credit application 
was subsequently rejected. However, such a consideration is not 
found in the existing literature, to which this paper contributes by 
trying to answer, from an empirical viewpoint and with particular 
reference to innovative firms, questions regarding the occurrence 
of credit rationing, the extent of the phenomenon, the role played 
by internal finance and different forms of innovative strategies.  
2. Data set and model 
The data used in this paper comes from the Survey of 
Manufacturing Firms (SMF), which was carried out by an Italian 
investment bank, Mediocredito Centrale (see www.mcc.it), in 1998. 
The SFM considers a stratified sample of Italian firms with at least 
11 and up to 500 employees: the stratification was made according 
to the number of employees, sectors composition and location, 
taking as benchmark the Census of Italian Firms. It also includes 
all the Italian manufacturing firms with more than 500 employees. 
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The SFM contains both questionnaire information about a firm’s 
structure, its behaviour in 1997 and balance sheet data for up to 
nine years (1989-1997). The wealth of data contained in this and 
the previous releases of the SMF have been used extensively in the 
literature (Atzeni and Carboni, 2003; Bagella et al. 2000; 
Filatotchev et al., 2002; Piga, 2002; Piga and Vivarelli, 2003). 
When testing for the existence of credit rationing, it is crucial 
to find a proper measure of the firm’s access to the credit market. 
As pointed out by Guiso (1998) the large majority of the empirical 
studies employ indirect indicators (see among the others: Fazzari et 
al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1994)), which are likely to catch other effects not 
related to liquidity constraints and to the access to the market for 
loans. As in Guiso (1998) we employ a direct measure of access to 
credit.  
In the SMF there are three questions that can be used to 
directly evaluate the firm’s access to credit market: 1) whether at 
the current market interest rate the firm wants an additional 
quantity of credit; 2) whether the firm is willing to pay a higher 
interest rate to obtain that additional quantity; 3) whether the firm 
applied but the credit has been denied. These are used to construct 
the two dependent variables under study. The first one, 
MORECRED, is equal to 1 if the firm declares it wanted more 
credit and was willing to pay either the current or a higher interest 
rate (see Guiso, 1998, for discussion). The second dependent 
variable is denoted as DENIED: it is equal to 1 if the firm declares 
to have applied for credit and this was denied. Therefore, credit 
rationing occurs when both MORECREDIT and DENIED are 
equal to 1.  
Note that credit constrained firms are identified in an exactly 
identical manner in Guiso (1998), where another dataset collected 
in 1993 by the Bank of Italy was used. However, in this study we 
extend Guiso’s single equation Probit approach by adopting a 
methodology that explicitly takes into account that the analysis of 
the determinants of a bank’s decision to deny credit is made on a 
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sample of firms which is not randomly selected. Indeed only if 
MORECRED is equal to 1, the firm may have applied to the bank 
for additional credit. In other words, a sample selectivity bias may 
arise if the probability of being short of financial resources is not 
distinguished from the that of being turned down when applying 
for credit.  
To address the sample selectivity issue, a bivariate probit 
model with censoring setting is employed (Greene, 2003, pp.713-
714). Formally the model can be represented as follows: 
(1) y*i1 = b ’i1 xi1 + e i1, yi1= 1 if   y*i1 >0, 0 otherwise 
      y*i2 = b ’i2 xi2 + e i2, y i2= 1 if   y*i2 >0, 0 otherwise 
 (e1, e2) ~ BVN (0,0,1,1, r) 
 (yi1, xi1) is observed only when yi2 = 1 
The likelihood function is: 
(2) 












iiiss xxxxxL brbbrbb  
where F2 denotes the bivariate normal cumulative distribution 
function with r= Cov [e i1, e i2]. Eq. (2) is maximized with respect to 
parameters b1, b2 and r. Thus, the methodology does not use the 
two-stage Heckit procedure due to Heckman (1979) but, instead, a 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach where the robust 
Huber/White estimator of the variance is used in place of the 
conventional MLE variance estimator. For more about this 
methodology and its applications, the reader is referred to Piga and 
Vivarelli (2003) and Montmarquette et al. (2001). Here we limit to 
recall that when r = 0, it is possible to estimate the model using 
indipendent probit equations.  
Using a two-equation methodology is important as it enables 
to discriminate between a variable’s effects on credit demand and 
supply. Consider, for instance, the role of internal financial 
resources. It reduces the probability that a firm needs credit but it 
also enhances the chances of a successful application. Thus, the 
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effect on the former does not have to be confounded with that on 
the latter.  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables used. The linear correlation is not reported 
to save on space, but no pair of regressors shows a linear 
correlation value above 0.365. To avoid simultaneity problems, all 
regressors are lagged. After having dropped missing values, the 
original sample size of 4495 observations, reduces to 3106. Most 
of the control variables employed are widely used in the literature 
(Guiso, 1998; Piga, 2002; Showalter, 1999). To evaluate the 
relationship between credit rationing and innovation, we consider 
total R&D, Self financed R&D and internal R&D outlays, all 
normalized by total assets. The two latter regressors have not been 
used before, although understanding how the R&D investment is 
financed or whether it is carried out purely internally or with 
external partners can shed some light on a lender’s decision to 
grant credit. Indeed, a greater share of self-financed R&D is 
associated with a “signalling effect” (Leland and Pyle, 1977), which 
may induce banks to be more confident in lending to the firm. 
Conversely, a purely internal R&D strategy may reinforce the need 
for secrecy, thereby exacerbating the information asymmetry 
between borrower and lender. Furthermore, external R&D entails 
both an increase in a firm’s cost flexibility, as external projects may 
be more easily cancelled, and a reduction in the amount of 
“intangible assets”: it should therefore enhance a lender’s 
propensity to grant credit. 
Table 2 reports the regressors’ means for the four sub-groups 
created by the dependent variables. In the first column are 
included the firms that do not need extra credit (86% of the 
sample), which are more profitable (EBIT around 9%), less 
indebted, bigger in size and mainly belonging to the North of the 
country. In the third column there are firms to whom credit was 
granted (78%), while the fourth column contain data about the 
remaining 22%, those turned down by the bank. Therefore credit 
rationed firms are 3.1% of the total sample (see Tab. 1), which is 
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similar to what previously reported by Guiso (1998) for a different 
firm’s sample. Rationed firms are less profitable (5.1%), more 
indebted, smaller in size and more likely belongs to the South of 
the country. 
3. Results 
Table 3 reports the results of the Bivariate Probit with sample 
selection estimation from three models, which differ only in the 
measure of R&D used. The three regressors are not jointly used to 
avoid obvious collinearity problems. The last two rows, reporting 
tests on the significance of ? and the comparison between the 
sample selection and the standard Probit technique, both indicate 
the appropriateness of the approach used.  
Generally, our estimates reveal that firms with a positive R&D 
budget in 1995-1996 tended not to require additional financing in 
1997. Such an effect is statistically significant when we include 
Self-financed or internal R&D budgets. Because in practice a great 
proportion of R&D spending corresponds to wages to R&D 
personnel, and firms want to avoid having to lay off knowledge 
workers, firms will set up R&D facilities only when they have 
secured sufficient financial funds (Hall, 2002). Hence, the negative 
signs in the selection equation for all the R&D variables.  
However, our findings reveal that when innovative firms 
applied for credit, their applications were more likely to be 
rejected. Indeed the estimates show that the probability of being 
denied credit is positively associated with R&D spending. More 
importantly, the statistical significance varies depending on the 
measure used. Total R&D expenditure is only weakly significant, 
thereby providing some support to the notion of a positive 
relationship between High-Tech firms and credit constraint. 
However, such a relationship disappears when we consider Self-
Financed R&D, which is not statistically significant at any 
conventional level. This suggests that self-financing of risky 
activities works as a credible signal used by lenders to separate 
good from bad borrowers. Furthermore, having a higher 
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proportion of in-house R&D activities increases the likelihood of 
being denied credit. This indicates the need, when investigating the 
factors leading to credit constraint in innovative firms, to 
differentiate between different types of R&D strategies, as total 
R&D may not reflect accurately the nature of the problems 
responsible for credit constraint. Indeed, a firm spending its entire 
R&D budget in extramural activities is unlikely to exhibit those 
characteristics which may lead to the failure of the lender-
borrower relationship. Finally, note how the absolute values of the 
R&D variables’ coefficients in both equations behave in 
accordance with our foregoing arguments. 
We now briefly comment on the estimates of the other 
explanatory variables. EBIT and Inventories have opposite 
impacts on MORECRED: profitability reduces the need of 
external finances while these may be requested to finance 
shortages in liquidity when a great proportion of working capital is 
immobilized in inventories. Neither of these regressors is 
significant in the DENIED equation. Conversely, Net Hiring 
reduces the probability of rejection, but it does not significantly 
increase the need of extra credit. Because a firm’s decision to hire 
is forward looking, given the associated adjustment costs, banks 
seem to consider an increase in the number of employees as “good 
news” because it signals about a firm’ s future profitability (Guiso, 
1998).  
The impact of Debt is particularly interesting, especially if 
compared with the simple Probit model. Guiso (1998) reports a 
positive and significant coefficient for this variable, i.e., debt has a 
very significant effect on the probability of being liquidity-
constrained. Our results reveal that short term debt has a very 
significant positive effect on the demand of additional credit - 
maybe because firms want funds to service existing debts - but not 
on a bank’s decision to deny credit. Similar arguments can be 
applied to the effect of geographical location on credit rationing. 
Firms in the North are less likely to need extra funds, but when 
they do, the probability of being denied credit is significantly 
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higher than that of firms in other areas. This is consistent with 
banks in the North being more skilled at screening. Firm’s size is 
not significant in the lending decision, while it has a negative 
impact on the probability of requiring additional funds, suggesting 
that small firms find it more difficult to access the credit market. 
The hypothesis that an ISO9000 quality certification should reduce 
the probability of rejection is only partly supported by the data. A 
firm owned by a bank is less likely to need extra credit; the 
opposite result holds for exporting firms.  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency cost of 
debt increases with the concentration of insider ownership, due to 
the managers/owners incentive to “go for broke”, i.e., invest in 
very risky projects with very high returns. If the investment fails, 
because of limited liability, lenders bear the consequence. Indeed, 
we find a positive relationship between concentration of insider 
ownership and the demand for more funds, although we should 
also expect such a concentration to be a major reason for denying 
credit. However, this regressor was highly insignificant in the 
DENIED equation, and was then omitted. Finally, our measure of 
non-debt Tax Shield reduces the probability of demanding more 
credit.  
4. Conclusions 
While the reasons why financing constraints may be more 
widespread in the high-tech sector have been extensively discussed 
in the literature (Hall, 2002), very few articles have attempted to 
investigate such an issue from an empirical viewpoint (Carpenter 
and Petersen, 2002; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Guiso, 1998). 
This paper uses an extensive dataset of Italian manufacturing firms 
to investigate the factors affecting a firm’s probability of being 
credit-constrained, after controlling for the determinants of its 
antecedent decision to apply for credit. Firms with a positive R&D 
budget are less likely to request extra funds but when they do we 
observe a higher probability of their application being rejected. 
Thus, our findings lend support to the arguments of credit 
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constraints being particularly severe for innovative firms. 
However, this outcome is partly mitigated when firms have a high 
proportion of Self-Financed R&D investments and/or when a 
significant amount of their R&D budget is spent in extramural 
activities. Thus, our findings reveal that total R&D expenditures 
may not accurately reflect the nature of the problems leading to 
potential credit market failure, and that more differentiated 
measures of R&D activity should be used to assess the presence of 
credit constraints in the high-tech sector.  
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Tab. 1 – Dependent variables and regressors  







MORECRED  dummy=1 if firm wanted more credit or was willing to pay a higher interest rate in 1997 
0.140 0 1 
DENIED dummy=1 if firm applied for credit but it has been denied in 1997 
0.031 0 1 
Independent variables     
EBITTA EBIT on total assets (mean 1995-96) 0.088 -0.089 0.685
INVENTCA inventories on current assets (mean 1995-96) 0.266 0.000 0.719
NETHIRINGS % of net hirings over total employees (mean 1995-96) 
0.019 -0.197 0.505
R&DTA R&D on total assets (mean 1995-96) 0.003 0.000 0.035
SFR&DTA % of Self Financed R&D on total assets (mean 1995-96) 
0.002 0.000 0.035
INTR&DTA Internal R&D outlays on total assets (mean 1995-96) 
0.002 0.000 0.035
STDTA Short term debt on total assets (mean 1995-96) 
0.144 0.000 0.597
BANKOWN dummy=1 if a firm is owned by a bank 0.051 0.000 1.000
EXPORT dummy=1 if firm has exported 0.722 0.000 1.000
HERFOWNCONTR Herfindhal index of share of control 59.505 0.000 100.00
ISO9000 dummy=1 if firm has obtained ISO 9000 certification 
0.292 0.000 1.000
NORTH dummy=1 if firms is located in the North of Italy 
0.830 0.000 1.000
TAXSHIELD depreciation of tangible assets over tangible assets 
0.118 0.000 0.396
SIZE Nat. Log of total Sales (mean 1995-96) 9.482 6.577 14.815
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Tab. 2 – Regressors means in the four possible outcomes 
 MORECRED DENIED (if 
MORECRED=1) 
 No (N=2671) Yes (N=435) No (N=339) Yes (N=96) 
EBIT on total assets  0.091 0.071 0.076 0.051 
Inventories on current assets 0.260 0.303 0.298 0.319 
% of net hirings over total 
employees 
0.018 0.022 0.025 0.010 
Total R&D on total assets 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
% of Self Financed R&D on 
total assets 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Internal R&D outlays on total 
assets 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Short term debt on total assets 0.140 0.168 0.155 0.216 
Owned by a bank (0,1) 0.055 0.030 0.029 0.031 
Export (0,1) 0.725 0.708 0.699 0.740 
Herfindhal index of share of 
control 
0.594 0.604 0.600 0.620 
ISO 9000 (0,1) 0.297 0.267 0.286 0.198 
North (0,1) 0.853 0.690 0.696 0.667 
Tax shield 0.120 0.103 0.107 0.088 
Log Sales 9.520 9.247 9.257 9.211 
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Tab. 3 – Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection estimation results.* 













Constant 0.384 0.435 0.349 0.426 0.431 0.405 
 (0.397)  (0.090)  (0.438)  (0.096)  (0.344)  (0.115)  
EBIT on total assets  -2.118 -1.529 -2.119 -1.534 -2.119 -1.521 
 (0.213)  (0.001)  (0.217)  (0.001)  (0.201)  (0.001)  
Inventories on current assets -0.464 0.666 -0.467 0.665 -0.466 0.668 
 (0.157)  (0.000)  (0.152)  (0.000)  (0.150)  (0.000)  
% of net hirings over total 
employees 
-1.196 0.631 -1.218 0.645 -1.201 0.640 
 (0.084)  (0.146)  (0.080)  (0.138)  (0.081)  (0.140)  
Total R&D on total assets 15.653 -6.991     
 (0.090)  (0.168)      
% of Self Financed R&D on 
total assets 
  15.065 -11.869   
   (0.180)  (0.055)    
Internal R&D outlays on total 
assets 
    23.530 -12.388 
     (0.043)  (0.043)  
Short term debt on total assets 0.413 0.747 0.436 0.740 0.408 0.743 
 (0.475)  (0.000)  (0.461)  (0.000)  (0.470)  (0.000)  
North (0,1)  0.351 -0.504 0.355 -0.504 0.353 -0.504 
 (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000)  
Log Sales 0.043 -0.149 0.047 -0.147 0.038 -0.145 
 (0.509)  (0.000)  (0.467)  (0.000)  (0.555) (0.000)  
ISO 9000 (0,1)  -0.181  -0.171  -0.181  
 (0.113)   (0.127)   (0.110)   
Owned by a bank (0,1)   -0.237  -0.234  -0.235 
  (0.091)   (0.097)   (0.090)  
Export (0,1)   0.106  0.107  0.108 
  (0.071)   (0.068)   (0.065)  
Herfindhal index of share of 
control 
 0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.014)   (0.013)   (0.013)  
Tax shield   -0.910  -0.892  -0.901 
  (0.018)   (0.021)   (0.019)  
Equations’ residuals 
correlation r   
-0.869 (0.026)  -0.869 (0.029)  -0.871 (0.021)  
Comparison Test a c2(8)= 30.38 (0.0002)  c2(8)= 29.04 (0.0003)  c2(8)= 31.69 (0.0001)  
* Robust p-values in parentheses. 
a Test of significance of the outcome equation of DENIED relative to the same model estimated using 
a standard Probit technique.  
